Trusted Platform Modules are the hardware roots of trust that edge servers, laptops and enterprise systems rely on to protect cryptographic keys - even from attackers with physical access. That assumption turns out to be wrong. Using a measurement setup costing approximately $2,000 and a power side-channel attack, a commercial TPM's ECDH private key can be fully extracted - without modifying the device, triggering tamper detection or leaving any trace of the attack.

In this session, led by Hardware and Software Security Researcher Roman Korkikian, you will learn:

• How SPI bus sniffing recovers vault keys and PCR values transmitted in cleartext between the TPM and the host system;
• How power consumption analysis during ECDH operations reveals private key material despite shuffling countermeasures, and how a special-point attack completes the extraction;
• Why coordinated disclosure for certified hardware is uniquely slow, and what that means for organizations trusting TPMs in hostile deployment environments.